Emotion expression in human punishment behavior by Erte Xiao & Daniel Houser









                                                 
* Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science & Department of Economics, George Mason 
University,4400 University Blvd. MSN 1B2,Fairfax, VA. 22030 
† E.X. and D.H. contributed equally to this work 
‡ To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: dhouser@gmu.edu 
  1Abstract: Evolutionary theory reveals that punishment is effective in promoting 
cooperation and maintaining social norms. Although it is accepted that emotions 
are connected to punishment decisions, there remains substantial debate over 
why humans use costly punishment. Here we show experimentally that 
constraints on emotion expression can increase the use of costly punishment. We 
report data from Ultimatum Games, where a proposer offers a division of a sum 
of money and a responder decides whether to accept the split, or reject and leave 
both players with nothing. Compared to the treatment where expressing 
emotions directly to proposers is prohibited, rejection of unfair offers is 
significantly less frequent when responders can convey their feelings to the 
proposer concurrently with their decisions. These data support the view that 
costly punishment might itself be used to express negative emotions, and suggest 
that future studies will benefit by recognizing that human demand for emotion 
expression can have significant behavioral consequences in social environments 
including families, courts, companies and markets. 
  2Emotion is related to many aspects of social life, from physical survival to social 
relationships and reproduction (1, 2). With or without self-awareness, humans often 
display their feelings in different ways when aroused (3-5). However, in many 
naturally occurring social situations individuals might believe that it is improper, or 
impossible, to reveal their inner feelings directly to, for example, a perceived 
antagonist. For instance, a sales clerk might find it improper to confront her customer 
(6). Because individuals often have a desire to express their emotions, the presence of 
constraints on expression can have important consequences for human behaviors (7, 
8). This research uses ultimatum games to investigate links between constraints on 
emotion expression and punishment decisions. 
The ultimatum game (9) is widely used to study costly punishment. In this 
game one subject (the proposer) starts with, say, $20, and the other subject (the 
responder) begins with nothing. The proposer suggests a division of the $20 between 
them, and the responder decides whether to accept the proposed split.  If accepted, 
then the money is split as proposed, and if not then both subjects earn nothing. 
Consequently, an income maximizing responder should accept any positive offer, and 
an income maximizing proposer would offer the responder the smallest possible 
positive amount.  
In fact, decades of data from ultimatum games show that responders who are 
offered 20% or so of the total amount choose to reject about half the time (10), and 
rejection rates increase as responder shares become smaller. Reasons for rejections 
have been a source of much debate. Recently however, brain imaging data has been 
  3collected while responders make their decisions, and the findings suggest that 
emotions are tightly connected to rejections (11).
§
Evolution has likely programmed human responders to prefer to make their 
negative emotions about unfair offers known to proposers (2, 3). However, standard 
ultimatum game protocols ensure that responders are constrained from conveying 
their feelings to proposers in any way except perhaps through choosing costly 
punishment. It follows that this constraint on emotion expression could increase the 
likelihood that responders choose to punish proposers who make unfair offers. Our 
hypothesis is that responders are less likely to choose costly punishment, and 
correspondingly more likely to accept unfair outcomes, when their feelings about 
unfair offers can be conveyed to the proposer in an alternative and less expensive way.  
 
Ultimatum Games with Emotion Expression   
To test our hypothesis we conduct two treatments with the ultimatum game—no 
emotion expression (NEE) and emotion expression (EE). NEE is the standard 
ultimatum game where the proposer and the responder are given $20 to split. The 
proposer decides how many cents out of each dollar to keep, and the responder 
decides whether to accept the offer (divide $20), or to reject the offer (divide $0).  In 
this treatment, rejecting or accepting the offer is the only way for the responder to 
display a reaction to her proposer about the offer.  
The EE treatment is exactly the same as NEE except that the responder is 
given an opportunity, not a requirement, to write a message to the proposer at no 
pecuniary cost. Any message is delivered to the proposer concurrently with the 
responder’s decision. Messages cannot have any strategic implications, because the 
                                                 
§ For more general research on the link between emotions and costly punishment, and debate on the 
reasons for costly punishment, see, e.g., (11-17). 
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experiments take place anonymously, and each pair of subjects plays the game only 
once. Rather, a message provides an opportunity for a responder to display voluntarily 
her feelings regarding her proposer’s division decision. Our hypothesis is supported if 
responders in EE use written messages to express emotions, and also reject unfair 
offers less frequently than in the NEE treatment. 
 
Experimental Design and Procedures 
EE and NEE Treatments. We obtained observations on 296 undergraduates: 62 
pairs of subjects in the NEE treatment and 86 pairs in the EE treatment. Experiments 
included undergraduate students recruited from the general student population at 
George Mason University, using standard procedures in place at the Interdisciplinary 
Center for Economic Science (ICES). We ran sixteen sessions, and the amount to be 
split in all cases was $20.  Subjects were randomly and separately assigned to two 
rooms: one for proposers and the other for responders. (In the instructions, which 
closely follow a format used by others (18), we called the proposer “Divider” and 
responder “Designator.”). Each subject was randomly assigned a letter as his or her 
ID in the experiment. The proposer and responder who received the same letter 
became a pair. In each room, subjects received an instruction sheet that explained the 
rules of the game.  After reading the instructions, each subject was required to 
successfully complete a quiz to verify comprehension. The game started after every 
subject finished the quiz.  
First, the proposer indicated his or her proposed split (how many cents out of 
each dollar would go to the proposer, and how many to the responder) on a decision 
sheet. After all proposers had finished, the experimenter took all the decision cards to 
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The responders decided whether to divide $20 (accept the offer) or $0 (reject the 
offer). Subjects were given pen and paper in both treatments. In the EE treatment, the 
responder also received a card for writing a message to her proposer. This card was 
distributed immediately prior to the distribution of the proposer’s decisions, and 
messages could have been written before, after or during their accept/reject decision 
process. Responders were asked to avoid indecent language, but were otherwise given 
no guidance regarding what, or whether, to write.  After responders had finished, the 
experimenter collected the decision cards (and any message cards in the EE treatment) 
and returned them to the proposers.  
Each pair of subjects played the game once. In both treatments subjects were 
given as much time as they liked to make their decisions, and the average length of 
the two treatments was the same. Subjects were paid privately with cash at the end of 
the experiment. Each subject received $5 show up bonus in addition to money earned 
in the game. Subjects were in the lab about 45 minutes and earned about $12 total on 
average. 
 
Message Evaluation. To test our hypothesis requires evaluating the emotional 
content of our responders’ messages. To do this, we used standard ICES procedures to 
recruit ten message evaluators from the general undergraduate population at George 
Mason University. Potential evaluators were excluded if they had previously 
participated in any ultimatum game experiment. After being seated in the laboratory, 
each evaluator was given the EE treatment’s responder’s instructions. We provided 
evaluators with instructions because some messages were not necessarily 
comprehensible without this context. After completing the instructions, they were 
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responders in the EE treatment.  Subjects were asked to classify the messages as 
showing positive or negative emotion, or as being “neutral” (not positive and not 
negative). Evaluators were not given any information regarding the situation of the 
responder who wrote the message: they did not know the proposed split or the 
responder’s decision. Subjects were paid $5 for attending and an additional $5 for 
completing the entire evaluation. To increase subjects’ attentiveness, they were told 
that after all evaluations were complete three messages would be randomly chosen as 
payoff messages. If the subject’s evaluation matched the most popular evaluation for 
a message, then they earned an additional $5. Subjects were in the laboratory for 
about an hour, and median earnings were $25. 
   Messages are classified according to the most popular classification chosen 
by the evaluators. There was a single most popular classification in 71 of 75 cases. 
The four ties were broken by the investigators’ own evaluations.   
 
Results 
Emotion expression and punishment.  Table 1 describes the distribution of 
proposers’ offers. In both treatments, nearly 2/3 of proposers offer at least 40% of the 
total amount to the responders and about 1/3 offer 20% or less. EE proposers were 
aware that responders could send messages along with their accept/reject decisions, 
but this did not change proposers’ decisions in relation to the baseline NEE case: the 
two treatments’ distributions are not statistically significantly different (Kolmogorov-
Smirnov two sample test, p=0.80). 
In support of our hypothesis, Table 1 also reports that subjects do send 
messages in EE, and that these messages do express emotion (see also Table 2, 
  7discussed below). About 87% of all responders wrote a message to their proposer, 
most of which express emotion. 79% (15 of 19) responders who received allocations 
of 20% or less wrote a message expressing a negative emotion, and none expressed a 
positive emotion. When the responder was offered at least half of the total amount, 
81% (29 out of 36) displayed positive emotions and none expressed negative 
emotions. This latter is not surprising, in that all responders in both treatments accept 
all offers that allocate at least $10 of the $20 to them.  
Rejection rates differ between the two treatments when the proposer offers the 
responder $4 (20%) or less. In the baseline NEE case, 60% (12 of 20) of such offers 
are rejected, a frequency that lines up well with previously reported results (10).  
However, in the EE treatment only 32% (6 of 19) reject the unfair offer, and this 
difference is statistically significant (Mann-Whitney test, z=1.757, one-tailed,  
p=0.04). Inspection of Table 1 reveals that most of the data are in cases where the 
responder is offered 20% ($4). This occurs 14 times in NEE, with seven responders 
(50%) choosing to reject.  In contrast, only 3 out of 15 responders (20%) do so in EE, 
and this difference is statistically significant (Mann-Whitney test, z=1.669, one-tailed,  
p=0.05). Because the (90,10) choice is made very infrequently by proposers, it is not 
possible to draw inferences based on responder decisions in that cell alone. Finally, 
note that rejection rates in the (60,40) cell are about 10% in each treatment. Figure 1 
summarizes these results. 
  
Responders’ messages. Table 2 details the messages written by all responders who 
faced offers of 20% or less, whether the message was classified as expressing a 
positive or negative emotion, or neutral (expressing neither a positive nor negative 
emotion) and each responder’s decision. (All messages are provided in supplementary 
  8information.) When the offer is exactly 20%, 10 of 12 responders who accepted the 
offer wrote a message, and nine of these ten messages were classified by the 
reviewers as expressing negative emotions. In addition, note that some responders 
accepted unfair offers even while indicating that they should not. This might indicate 
that the egalitarian or retaliation motivation (16, 17) for punishment can be 
diminished by providing subjects an opportunity to express their feelings. Overall, 
these data provide convergent support for the possibility that costly punishment is 
used by responders as emotion expression, and that responders are less likely to use 
costly punishment, and instead accept unfair outcomes, if they have a less expensive 
alternative mechanism to express negative emotions toward the proposers.  
 
Discussion 
Negative emotions like anger or disapproval can be triggered when individuals are 
treated unfairly (11-15), and evolutionary theory argues there can be benefits to 
expressing negative emotions in some contexts (2, 3, 19, 20).
** In our emotion 
expression treatment, for example, responders might feel better after explicitly 
displaying their emotions to proposers (4, 21). Or perhaps sending messages of 
disapproval directly to one’s proposer might be a satisfying alternative form of 
punishment (13, 22). Or, a responder might believe that accepting a low offer would 
be interpreted by the proposer as indicating that the responder accepts an inferior 
position. By expressing anger or disapproval regarding the low offer, responders can 
deny this interpretation.   
When direct channels for emotion expression are either impossible or 
undesirable, our results suggest that humans might instead resort to indirect or even 
                                                 
** More general discussion of the evolutionary importance of punishment is here (23-25). 
  9costly methods to convey negative feelings, particularly costly punishment. This 
highlights the importance humans attach to negative emotion expression.  
Constraints on emotion expression might be a contributing factor for decisions 
typically observed in many naturally occurring and experimental environments, 
including highly studied trust, public goods and bargaining games (18, 26-33). For 
example, subjects in public goods games are generally found to decrease their 
contribution to the public goods when others contribute little (28-32). If these 
decisions are partially motivated by a desire to express unhappiness to free riders, 
then such reductions in contributions might be less common if subjects were provided 
an alternative way to express their feelings.  
In addition to negative emotion expression, it is important to emphasize that 
about 80% of responders in our experiments displayed positive emotions toward 
proposers when they received fair offers. Presumably, a demand to express positive 
emotions can also affect decisions. For example, in a typical “trust” game (26, 27), 
where the investor transfers part of her endowment to a trustee, the only way for the 
trustee to say “thank you” is to reciprocate and return some amount to the investor. If 
this reciprocity is in fact motivated by human demand to express positive emotions 
(such as happiness or appreciation) then measured trustworthiness (amounts returned 
to investors by trustees) might decrease if trustees are given an alternative, less-costly 
channel to express appreciation to investors. Further exploration in this area, 
particularly efforts at eliciting the “demand curve” for both positive and negative 
emotion expression, would be useful.  
Our results rely, in part, on classification of the emotional content of 
responders’ messages. The classification approach we adopted is standard in its use of 
independent, objective and hypothesis-blind human evaluators. Nevertheless, we 
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said this, it should be reiterated that there was substantial agreement among our 
independent evaluators with respect to the emotional content of the vast majority 
(95%) of responders’ messages.   
The desire to express emotions, and constraints on that demand, are a 
ubiquitous feature human social interaction. The results of our study are a step 
towards an improved understanding of human behavior in environments that involve 
emotions (6, 34, 35). Our research, of course, provides only one perspective on how 
emotion is connected to human behavior. Emotions might have different effects in 
different contexts. More work and specific models are needed to advance our 
understanding of how emotions are involved in human decision-making processes. 
  11Table 1 Distribution of proposers’ offers and responders’ messages 
NEE                   EE 
% of responders who send message  Offer 
Number % Number %  Positive 
Emotion 
Negative 
Emotion  Neutral Total 
Responder offered ≥ 50%  80.56  0  11.11  91.67
20/80  1 1.61 0 0.00 
40/60  1 1.61 4 4.65 
50/50 21 33.87 32 37.21
      
Responder offered 40%  22.58  32.26  25.81  80.65
60/40 19 30.65 31 36.05        
Responder offered < 40%  0  78.95  10.53  89.48
80/20 14 22.58 15 17.44
90/10  6 9.68 4 4.65 
      
Total  62  86   87.21
 
For the offer, the first number is the proposer’s percentage share and the second 
number is the responder’s percentage share. Messages are classified according to the 












  12Table 2. Messages written when the offer is 80/20 or 90/10 
Offer Subject  Accept  Message  Emotion 
1  No  Sorry, I'm a person too. When the cards are all in my 
hand, you should try to appease me instead of offend 
me. There was a 50/50 split. It couldn't have been easier. 
So, since you decided you are obviously better than I 
am. You get nothing. Enjoy it, I know I will.                      
Negative 
2  No  If you would have been less greedy than maybe we 
would have gotten some money. Treat everyone as you 
want them to treat you.                                                        
Negative 
3  No  Should not have been greedy. Oh well, you make 
nothing.  
Negative 
4 Yes     
5  Yes  Thanks For Nothing.                                                             Negative 
6  Yes  It would have been better if you had chosen D. I was 
going to split $0, so you would no gain. But $4 is better 
than nothing. So I decide to go with it. Have I been the 
divider, I would have chosen D.                                          
Negative 
7  Yes  I guess I'll do $20.You are getting way more than me. 
But if I screw you over I get no Money either :-)              
Negative 
8  Yes  Tuesday is election day! Vote for Kerry Read the 
platform johnkerry.com :-)                                                  
Neutral 
9  Yes  Not fair, I wish I am the divider! But I get $4 is better 
than none.                                                                             
Negative 
10  Yes  Too selfish. I would rather get nothing and let you get a 
penny.                                                                                   
Negative 
11  Yes  Dude, that's kina greedy and I'm seriously contemplating 
designating $0… I was hoping you'd choose D so we'd 
both be happy but whatever, Grrrr…                                   
Negative 
12  Yes  You suck, you are lucky I'm broke!  If you did the A I 
would have put 0.                                                                 
Negative 
13  Yes  You are lucky I'm broke!                                                      Negative 
14 Yes     
80/20 
15  Yes  I should have chosen to divide by $0 but I'll take the $9 
since I don't like wasting my time. Enjoy your $16.           
Negative 
        
1  No  Hey, we could both benefited equally, but no –sorry.          Negative 
2  No  I don't think so buddy!                                                          Negative 
3  No  Well, we all want to make a little bit. I have the money 
here. Since you are my divider, I think it would better 
for the both of us to go for rule D. either that or we 
won't get nothing at all...                                                      
Neutral 
90/10 
4  Yes  We should have divided the money equally. Don't be so 
greedy. People are always out for themselves                     
Negative 
In the “Offer” column, the first number is the proposer’s percentage share and the 
second number is the responder’s percentage share. As described in the experiment’s 
instructions, “D” stands for an equal-split offer and “A” stands for an offer of 10% to 
the responder (so 90% to the proposer). The last column shows whether the message 
is classified as expressing positive emotion, negative emotion or neutral (i.e. neither 
positive nor negative).  









































Columns show mean +/- s.e.m. The first number is the proposer’s percentage share 
and second number is the responder’s percentage share. When proposers offer 60/40, 
EE responders reject the offer at nearly the same rate as NEE.  When the offer is 
either 80/20 or 90/10 the EE rejection rate is lower. The difference is significant in the 
80/20 cell, as well as when the 80/20 and 90/10 data are pooled (p<0.05). A responder 
is more likely to accept an unfair division if she can express her emotions about the 
offer concurrently with her decision. 
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Offer Accept  Message  Emotion 
(40, 60)  Yes  WoW! Much less selfish than I expected! Nice decision, because 
I really was going to write 0 if it were less than 50. I'm very 
happy with your decision. Thank you, and have a wonderful 
evening with your $13 :) love! D"                                             
Positive 
  Yes  Let's be fair to one another Let's get the money   Neutral 
  Yes  Thanks! Since you weren't self-seeking, I chose $20. Even if 
you'd gone 60-40 or 50-50, I'd have done it too. Anything more 
in your favor, I'd have gone with $0. Be Blessed!  
Positive 
 Yes  Thanks    Positive 
(50, 50)  Yes  Good decision.  Positive 
  Yes  Thanks for making it even!   Positive 
  Yes  Good choice   Positive 
  Yes  Hi, I hope we get $-Happy Halloween! Good choice on the 
50/50 things  
Positive 
  Yes  Thank you for sharing  Positive 
 Yes  Good  Job!  Positive 
  Yes  Hello, there: You've made a right choice, haha. Thanks.  Positive 
  Yes  A noble economic decision….  Positive 
  Yes  Thanks for choosing to divide equally!  Positive 
 Yes  Fair  enough  Positive 
  Yes  Thanks, I hoped that you would pick that.  Positive 
  Yes  Hey, keep choosing rule D and I'll keep choosing to divide $20 
(unless you want to choose rule E through G, then that would be 
better). If you choose any rule before rule D, I'll choose to 
divider $0. It's your choose 
Neutral 
 Yes  Thanks.  Positive 
  Yes  We think alike! 50/50 is the way to go :) Enjoy!  Positive 
  Yes  That's how I like it .Straight down the middle--no funny 
business. If it would have been on even, we would have still 
been broke. You're the coolest, I love you!--Love your secret 
admirer/Designator 
Positive 
  Yes  That was a good decision; otherwise I wouldn't have divided 
$20.  
Positive 
  Yes  Excellent choice My comrade!  Positive 
 Yes  Good  choice!  Positive 
  Yes  The dog barks at night  Neutral 
  17Offer Accept    Message  Emotion 
(50, 50)  Yes  Nice Choice! Anything else, and we both would have walked 
away with nothing. 
Positive 
  Yes  Good move! (although you could have given me more!):-)  Positive 
 Yes  Fair  deal  Positive 
  Yes  Thank you :-)  Positive 
  Yes  Since you choose rule D we both leave with same amount of 
money. I will divide 20 so we get the equal amount of money. 
Positive 
  Yes  Hey, buddy, I always agree that we should split the money 50/50 
because that's what we are here for. Trying to get some $. Ay, 
Good choice :) 
Positive 
  Yes  I would have designated $20 for any rule up to B by the way, 
because money is money. Rule A I would have designated $0 as 
punishment for greed. 
Neutral 
  Yes  Hey, I liked your choice! However, you could have gotten away 
with role C. But thanks a lot. Have a good one. 
Positive 
 Yes  Good  choice!  Positive 
  Yes  Good choice! We both come out with the same cash! :)  Positive 
(60, 40)  No  Don't get greedy now.  Negative 
  No  Why should you get more $ than me? Only generosity or 
fairness would payoff. 
Negative 
  No  Sorry. Be a little more fair next time. Eh? P.s. I decided before I 
got your rule that if it wasn't 50/50. No one was getting money. 
Negative 
  No  I understand your gamble, but you should have gone 50/50  Neutral 
  Yes  Why do you have to be greedy?  Negative 
  Yes  Exactly what I had expected. You have a good business mind, 
because that is the maximum I can agree to pay a divider. 
Thanks. 
Positive 
  Yes  You're a little greedy here!! But it's better than nothing, so I'll 
choose to split $20 instead of $0 
Negative 
 Yes  Hi  Neutral 
  Yes  I would have chosen D, much safer. But, hey, you win, enjoy the 
$4, buy a cookie or something 
Negative 
  Yes  :) What ever  Neutral 
  Yes  Thanks for not picking A!  Positive 
  18Offer Accept  Message  Emotion 
(60, 40)  Yes  A little greedy~would 've been fair if you would've chosen rule 
D~But I wouldn't really expect fairness. Everyone is here for the 
money. Thanks for not choosing A or B~Then we both would've 
left w/ $0 
Neutral 
  Yes  I almost gave us both 0, but you have no idea how much debt I'm 
in and these few dollars will help. But why? Why not make it 
50/50? I decided I would accept 60/40 early on, as the lowest I 
would go. But I can only assume you need this more than I do 
why else would you not make it equal? Thanks. 
Negative 
  Yes  50-50 or nothing at all  Negative 
  Yes  Smart choice. We both get paid relatively fairly. Not 50/50 but 
close enough. :-) 
Positive 
  Yes  So that we both maximize. Chose option D and I'll share $20. 
Many thanks. 
Positive 
  Yes  Thank you for not being completely greedy and giving me a 
portion of the money…I was hoping for 50/50 but hey…I'm 
making out alright :) Thanks 
Positive 
  Yes  You should have split it 50/50 Common now! Oh well better 
than A 
Negative 
  Yes  Exactly what I would have chosen  Neutral 
  Yes  Spend it well  Neutral 
  Yes  C'est la vie  Neutral 
  Yes  Thanks for not choosing rule A. Because then I would have only 
ended up with $7 for this whole experiment and the only reason 
I did this experiment was for beer money tonight $13 should at 
least get me a case. 
Positive 
  Yes  I dunno about that. You do realize that you only made $2 more 
than what you would have made choosing C. 
Negative 
  Yes  It takes a tough man to make a tender chicken"--Short circuit. 
All your buses are belonging to us" name the game. 
Neutral 
  Yes  I'm fine with your decision. Need that money.  Positive 
(80, 20)  No  Sorry, I'm a person too. When the cards are all in my hand, you 
should try to appease me instead of offend me. There was a 
50/50 split. It couldn't have been easier. SO, since you decided 
you are obviously better than I am. You get nothing. Enjoy it, I 
know I will. 
Negative 
  No  If you would have been less greedy than maybe we would have 
gotten some money. Treat everyone as you want them to treat 
you. 
Negative 
  No  Should not have been greedy. Oh well, you make nothing.  Negative 
  19Offer Accept  Message  Emotion 
(80, 20)  Yes  Thanks For Nothing.   Negative 
  Yes  It would have been better if you had chosen D. I was going to 
split $0, so you would no gain. But $4 is better than nothing. So 
I decide to go with it. Have I been the divider, I would have 
chosen D. 
Negative 
  Yes  I guess I'll do $20.You are getting way more than me--But if I 
screw you over I get no Money either---:-) 
Negative 
  Yes  Tuesday is election day! Vote for Kerry Read the platform 
johnkerry.com :-) 
Neutral 
  Yes  Not fair, I wish I am the divider! But I get $4 is better than none  Negative 
  Yes  too selfish. I would rather get nothing and let you get a penny.  Negative 
  Yes  Dude, that's kina greedy and I'm seriously contemplating 
designating $0… I was hoping you'd choose D so we'd both be 
happy but whatever, Grrrr… 
Negative 
  Yes  you suck, you are lucky I'm broke! If you did the A I would have 
put 0 
Negative 
  Yes  you are lucky I'm broke!  Negative 
  Yes  I should have chose to divide by $0 by I'll take the $9 since I 
don't like wasting my time. Enjoy your $16. 
Negative 
(90, 10)  No  Hey, we could both benefited equally, but no --sorry  Negative 
  No  I don't think so buddy!  Negative 
  No  Well, we all want to make a little bit. I have the money here. 
Since you are my divider, I think it would but for the both of us 
to go for rule D. either that or we won't get nothing at all... 
Neutral 
  Yes  We should have divided the money equally. Don't be so greedy. 
People are always out for themselves 
Negative 
 
In the “Offer” column, the first number in parentheses is proposer’s share and the 
second number is responder’s share. As described in the experiment’s instructions, 
“A” stands for (90, 10) offer, “B” stands for (80, 20) offer, “C” stands for (60, 40) 
offer and “ D” stands for (50, 50) offer. The last column shows whether the message 
is classified as expressing positive emotion, negative emotion or neutral (neither 
positive nor negative emotion).  
 
  20Supplementary Methods   
 




Thank you for coming! You've earned $5 for showing up on time. Whatever you earn in the rest of the 
session will be in addition to this $5. The instructions explain how you can make decisions. Please read 
these instructions carefully! There is no talking at any time during this experiment. If you have a 
question please raise your hand, and an experimenter will assist you. 
 
You are in Room A. You will be randomly and anonymously paired with someone in Room B. You 
will never be informed of the identity of this person, either during or after the experiment. Similarly, 
your matched participant will never be informed about your identity. You are in the role of Divider and 
your matched participant is in the role of Designator. You and the Designator will participate only 
once in this decision problem. 
  
This is how the experiment works. 
 
The task of each pair is to divide either $0 or $20 between the two of you. How much money you end 
up with at the end of the experiment depends on the decisions both people in the pair make. 
 
Divider (You) 
You will first choose a Dividing Rule (described in detail below).  A dividing Rule determines how 
much of each dollar will go to the Divider (you) and how much will go to the Designator (your 
counterpart).   
 
Dividing Rule 
The possible divisions must be chosen from the table below.  You must choose only one of them. 
 
Possible Dividing Rules  Of each Dollar to divide, the rule is 
A  Divider gets 90¢  and Designator gets 10¢ 
B  Divider gets 80¢  and Designator gets 20¢ 
C  Divider gets 60¢ and Designator gets 40¢ 
D  Divider gets 50¢ and Designator gets 50¢ 
E  Divider gets 40¢  and Designator gets 60¢ 
F  Divider gets 20¢  and Designator gets 80¢ 
G  Divider gets 10¢ and Designator gets 90¢ 
Designator (Your counterpart) 
Given the dividing rule that you chose, the Designator decide how many dollars, either $0 or $20, will 
be divided.  
 
If the Designator chooses to divide $0, then both you and your Designator will get $0 no matter which 
rule is chosen by you. If the Designator chooses to divide $20, the earnings of you and your Designator 
are listed in the table below, and depend on which dividing rule you chose. 
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Of each Dollar to divide, the rule  
chosen by the Divider(You) is 
If Designator  
chose to divide $20 
A  Divider gets 90¢  and Designator gets 10¢ Divider  gets  $18  and Designator gets $2 
B  Divider gets 80¢  and Designator gets 20¢ Divider  gets  $16 and Designator gets $4 
C  Divider gets 60¢ and Designator gets 40¢ Divider  gets  $12 and Designator gets $8 
D  Divider gets 50¢ and Designator gets 50¢ Divider  gets  $10 and Designator gets $10 
E  Divider gets 40¢  and Designator gets 60¢ Divider  gets  $8  and Designator gets $12 
F  Divider gets 20¢  and Designator gets 80¢ Divider  gets  $4  and Designator gets $16 





Step 1: Randomly and anonymously assign counterparts  
There are several envelopes in Room A and Room B.  In each envelope in Room A and Room B there 
is a tag marked with a unique letter.  Each envelope looks the same. Everyone in Room A and Room B 
will randomly pick an envelope.  Persons in Room A and Room B who choose the tag with the same 
letter will be paired.  
 
Step 2: Divider chooses the rule 
The Divider will be given a card where he/she can write down his/her decision. A sample of the 
decision card is as below: 
  Divider: (Dividing rule) 
  I choose dividing rule_______. That is, for each dollar to divide: 
Divider gets_____¢     Designator gets____¢ 
 
Designator: (How many dollars to divide?  $0 or $20) 
  I choose to divide $______.  Therefore,  






After finishing the decision, the Divider will also write down the tag letter on the back of the decision 
cards and put it into his/her envelope. After every Divider has finished, the experimenter will take the 
envelopes to Room B.  
 
Step 3: Designator makes a decision. 
The experimenter will give each Divider’s envelope to his/her Designator according to the tag letter on 
the card. The designator will then decide how many dollars to divide ($0 or $20), write that decision on 
the decision card and put the decision card into the envelope. 
 
Step 4:  Return cards to the Dividers 
After all of the Designators have finished, the experimenter will take all of the envelopes to Room A 
and return the envelopes to their Dividers, according to their tag letters. When the Divider gets his/her 
envelope, he/she will see his/her Designator’s decision.  
 
Step 5: Receive cash payment privately 
  22Each Divider will be called one by one to the experimenter.  When called, the Divider will take his/her 
decision card, and the experimenter will calculate his/her final earnings and pay him/her privately. 
Then the Divider will exit the lab and drop all the other supplies into the box near the monitor room.  
The Designators will be paid after all of the Dividers have been paid and have left the lab. When called, 
the Designator will show the experimenter the tag letter and will be paid according to the 
corresponding decision card.  
 
Throughout this experiment, you won’t meet any Designator in Room B. 
End of Instructions 
Please raise your hand to indicate that you are finished reading these instructions. When you do, an 
experimenter will give you a few questions to ensure that you understand how you make decisions.  
 
 




Thank you for coming! You've earned $5 for showing up on time. Whatever you earn in the rest of the 
session will be in addition to this $5. The instructions explain how you can make decisions. Please read 
these instructions carefully! There is no talking at any time during this experiment. If you have a 
question please raise your hand, and an experimenter will assist you. 
 
You are in Room B. You will be randomly and anonymously paired with someone in Room A. You 
will never be informed of the identity of this person, either during or after the experiment. Similarly, 
your matched participant will never be informed about your identity. You are in the role of Designator 
and your matched participant is in the role of Divider. You and the Divider will participate only once 
in this decision problem. 
  
This is how the experiment works. 
 
The task of each pair is to divide either $0 or $20 between the two of you. How much money you end 
up with at the end of the experiment depends on the decisions both people in the pair make. 
 
Divider (Your counterpart) 
The Divider will first choose a Dividing Rule (described in detail below).  A dividing Rule determines 
how much of each dollar will go to the Divider and how much will go to the Designator (you).   
 
Dividing Rule 
The possible divisions must be chosen from the table below.  The Divider must choose only one of 
them. 
 
Possible Dividing Rules  Of each Dollar to divide, the rule is 
A  Divider gets 90¢  and Designator gets 10¢ 
B  Divider gets 80¢  and Designator gets 20¢ 
C  Divider gets 60¢ and Designator gets 40¢ 
D  Divider gets 50¢ and Designator gets 50¢ 
E  Divider gets 40¢  and Designator gets 60¢ 
F  Divider gets 20¢  and Designator gets 80¢ 
G  Divider gets 10¢ and Designator gets 90¢ 
 
Designator (You) 
Given the dividing rule that the Designator chose, you decide how many dollars, either $0 or $20, will 
be divided.  
 
If you choose to divide $0, then both you and your divider will get $0 no matter which rule is chosen 
by the Divider. If you choose to divide $20, the earnings of your Divider and you are listed in the table 
below, and depend on which dividing rule the Divider chose. 
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Of each Dollar to divide, the rule 
 chosen by the Divider is 
If Designator (You)  
chose to divide $20 
A  Divider gets 90¢  and Designator gets 10¢ Divider  gets  $18  and Designator gets $2 
B  Divider gets 80¢  and Designator gets 20¢ Divider  gets  $16 and Designator gets $4 
C  Divider gets 60¢ and Designator gets 40¢ Divider  gets  $12 and Designator gets $8 
D  Divider gets 50¢ and Designator gets 50¢ Divider  gets  $10 and Designator gets $10 
E  Divider gets 40¢  and Designator gets 60¢ Divider  gets  $8  and Designator gets $12 
F  Divider gets 20¢  and Designator gets 80¢ Divider  gets  $4  and Designator gets $16 




Step 1: Randomly and anonymously assign counterparts  
There are several envelopes in Room A and Room B.  In each envelope in Room A and Room B there 
is a tag marked with a unique letter.  Each envelope looks the same. Everyone in Room A and Room B 
will randomly pick an envelope.  Persons in Room A and Room B who choose the tag with the same 
letter will be paired.  
 
Step 2: Divider chooses the rule 
The Divider will be given a card where he/she can write down his/her decision. A sample of the 
decision card is as below: 
   Divider: (Dividing rule) 
  I choose dividing rule_______. That is, for each dollar to divide: 
Divider gets_____¢     Designator gets____¢ 
 
Designator: (How many dollars to divide?  $0 or $20) 
  I choose to divide $______.  Therefore,  
Divider gets $_____     Designator gets $_____ 







After finishing the decision, the Divider will also write down the tag letter on the back of the decision 
cards and put it into his/her envelope. After every Divider has finished, the experimenter will take the 
envelopes to Room B.  
 
Step 3: Designator makes a decision. 
The experimenter will give each Divider’s envelope to his/her Designator according to the tag letter on 
the card. The designator will then decide how many dollars to divide ($0 or $20), write that decision on 
the decision card and put the decision card into the envelope. 
 
Step 4:  Return cards to the Dividers 
After all of the Designators have finished, the experimenter will take all of the envelopes to Room A 
and return the envelopes to their Dividers, according to their tag letters. When the Divider gets his/her 
envelope, he/she will see his/her Designator’s decision.  
 
  25Step 5: Receive cash payment privately 
Each Divider will be called one by one to the experimenter.  When called, the Divider will take his/her 
decision card, and the experimenter will calculate his/her final earnings and pay him/her privately. 
Then the Divider will exit the lab and drop all the other supplies into the box near the monitor room.  
The Designators will be paid after all of the Dividers have been paid and have left the lab. When called, 
the Designator will show the experimenter the tag letter and will be paid according to the 
corresponding decision card.  
 
Throughout this experiment, you won’t meet any Divider in Room A. 
 
End of Instructions 
Please raise your hand to indicate that you are finished reading these instructions. When you do, an 
experimenter will give you a few questions to ensure that you understand how you make decisions.  




Thank you for coming! You've earned $5 for showing up on time. Whatever you earn in the rest of the 
session will be in addition to this $5. The instructions explain how you can make decisions. Please read 
these instructions carefully! There is no talking at any time during this experiment. If you have a 
question please raise your hand, and an experimenter will assist you. 
 
You are in Room A. You will be randomly and anonymously paired with someone in Room B. You 
will never be informed of the identity of this person, either during or after the experiment. Similarly, 
your matched participant will never be informed about your identity. You are in the role of Divider and 
your matched participant is in the role of Designator. You and the Designator will participate only 
once in this decision problem. 
  
This is how the experiment works. 
 
The task of each pair is to divide either $0 or $20 between the two of you. How much money you end 
up with at the end of the experiment depends on the decisions both people in the pair make. 
 
Divider (You) 
You will first choose a Dividing Rule (described in detail below).  A dividing Rule determines how 
much of each dollar will go to the Divider (you) and how much will go to the Designator (your 
counterpart).   
 
Dividing Rule 
The possible divisions must be chosen from the table below.  You must choose only one of them. 
 
Possible Dividing Rules  Of each Dollar to divide, the rule is 
A  Divider gets 90¢  and Designator gets 10¢ 
B  Divider gets 80¢  and Designator gets 20¢ 
C  Divider gets 60¢ and Designator gets 40¢ 
D  Divider gets 50¢ and Designator gets 50¢ 
E  Divider gets 40¢  and Designator gets 60¢ 
F  Divider gets 20¢  and Designator gets 80¢ 
G  Divider gets 10¢ and Designator gets 90¢ 
 
Designator (Your counterpart) 
Given the dividing rule that you chose, the Designator decide how many dollars, either $0 or $20, will 
be divided. He/she can also write a short message to you. The message can be anything the Designator 
wants to say to you. Please note: Foul language and threatening messages are not allowed. 
 
If the Designator chooses to divide $0, then both you and your Designator will get $0 no matter which 
rule is chosen by you. If the Designator chooses to divide $20, the earnings of you and your Designator 
are listed in the table below, and depend on which dividing rule you chose. 
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Of each Dollar to divide, the rule 
 chosen by the Divider(You) is 
If Designator  
chose to divide $20 
A  Divider gets 90¢  and Designator gets 10¢ Divider  gets  $18  and Designator gets $2 
B  Divider gets 80¢  and Designator gets 20¢ Divider  gets  $16 and Designator gets $4 
C  Divider gets 60¢ and Designator gets 40¢ Divider  gets  $12 and Designator gets $8 
D  Divider gets 50¢ and Designator gets 50¢ Divider  gets  $10 and Designator gets $10 
E  Divider gets 40¢  and Designator gets 60¢ Divider  gets  $8  and Designator gets $12 
F  Divider gets 20¢  and Designator gets 80¢ Divider  gets  $4  and Designator gets $16 




Step 1: Randomly and anonymously assign counterparts  
There are several envelopes in Room A and Room B.  In each envelope in Room A and Room B there 
is a tag marked with a unique letter.  Each envelope looks the same. Everyone in Room A and Room B 
will randomly pick an envelope.  Persons in Room A and Room B who choose the tag with the same 
letter will be paired.  
 
Step 2: Divider chooses the rule 
The Divider will be given a card where he/she can write down his/her decision. A sample of the 
decision card is as below: 
  
Divider: (Dividing rule) 
  I choose dividing rule_______. That is, for each dollar to divide: 
Divider gets_____¢     Designator gets____¢ 
 
Designator: (How many dollars to divide?  $0 or $20) 
  I choose to divide $______.  Therefore,  







After finishing the decision, the Divider will also write down the tag letter on the back of the decision 
cards and put it into his/her envelope. After every Divider has finished, the experimenter will take the 
envelopes to Room B.  
 
Step 3: Designator makes a decision. 
The experimenter will give each Divider’s envelope to his/her Designator according to the tag letter on 
the card. The designator will then decide how many dollars to divide ($0 or $20) and write that 
decision on the decision card. The designator will also be given a blank card where he/she can write a 
short message to the Divider and put both the decision card and the message card into the envelope. 
 
Step 4:  Return cards to the Dividers 
After all of the Designators have finished, the experimenter will take all of the envelopes to Room A 
and return the envelopes to their Dividers, according to their tag letters. When the Divider gets his/her 
envelope, he/she will see his/her Designator’s decision and the message the Designator wrote.  
 
Step 5: Receive cash payment privately 
  28Each Divider will be called one by one to the experimenter.  When called, the Divider will take his/her 
decision card, and the experimenter will calculate his/her final earnings and pay him/her privately. 
Then the Divider will exit the lab and drop all the other supplies into the box near the monitor room.  
The Designators will be paid after all of the Dividers have been paid and have left the lab. When called, 
the Designator will show the experimenter the tag letter and will be paid according to the 
corresponding decision card.  
 
Throughout this experiment, you won’t meet any Designator in Room B. 
End of Instructions 
Please raise your hand to indicate that you are finished reading these instructions. When you do, an 
experimenter will give you a few questions to ensure that you understand how you make decisions.  




Thank you for coming! You've earned $5 for showing up on time. Whatever you earn in the rest of the 
session will be in addition to this $5. The instructions explain how you can make decisions. Please read 
these instructions carefully! There is no talking at any time during this experiment. If you have a 
question please raise your hand, and an experimenter will assist you. 
 
You are in Room B. You will be randomly and anonymously paired with someone in Room A. You 
will never be informed of the identity of this person, either during or after the experiment. Similarly, 
your matched participant will never be informed about your identity. You are in the role of Designator 
and your matched participant is in the role of Divider. You and the Divider will participate only once 
in this decision problem. 
  
This is how the experiment works. 
 
The task of each pair is to divide either $0 or $20 between the two of you. How much money you end 
up with at the end of the experiment depends on the decisions both people in the pair make. 
 
Divider (Your counterpart) 
The Divider will first choose a Dividing Rule (described in detail below).  A dividing Rule determines 
how much of each dollar will go to the Divider and how much will go to the Designator (you).   
 
Dividing Rule 
The possible divisions must be chosen from the table below.  The Divider must choose only one of 
them. 
 
Possible Dividing Rules  Of each Dollar to divide, the rule is 
A  Divider gets 90¢  and Designator gets 10¢ 
B  Divider gets 80¢  and Designator gets 20¢ 
C  Divider gets 60¢ and Designator gets 40¢ 
D  Divider gets 50¢ and Designator gets 50¢ 
E  Divider gets 40¢  and Designator gets 60¢ 
F  Divider gets 20¢  and Designator gets 80¢ 
G  Divider gets 10¢ and Designator gets 90¢ 
 
Designator (You) 
Given the dividing rule that the Designator chose, you decide how many dollars, either $0 or $20, will 
be divided. You can also write a short message to your Divider. The message can be anything you want 
to say to the Divider. Please note: Foul language and threatening messages are not allowed. 
 
If you choose to divide $0, then both you and your divider will get $0 no matter which rule is chosen 
by the Divider. If you choose to divide $20, the earnings of your Divider and you are listed in the table 
below, and depend on which dividing rule the Divider chose. 
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Of each Dollar to divide, the rule 
 chosen by the Divider is 
If Designator (You)  
chose to divide $20 
A  Divider gets 90¢  and Designator gets 10¢ Divider  gets  $18  and Designator gets $2 
B  Divider gets 80¢  and Designator gets 20¢ Divider  gets  $16 and Designator gets $4 
C  Divider gets 60¢ and Designator gets 40¢ Divider  gets  $12 and Designator gets $8 
D  Divider gets 50¢ and Designator gets 50¢ Divider  gets  $10 and Designator gets $10 
E  Divider gets 40¢  and Designator gets 60¢ Divider  gets  $8  and Designator gets $12 
F  Divider gets 20¢  and Designator gets 80¢ Divider  gets  $4  and Designator gets $16 




Step 1: Randomly and anonymously assign counterparts  
There are several envelopes in Room A and Room B.  In each envelope in Room A and Room B there 
is a tag marked with a unique letter.  Each envelope looks the same. Everyone in Room A and Room B 
will randomly pick an envelope.  Persons in Room A and Room B who choose the tag with the same 
letter will be paired.  
 
Step 2: Divider chooses the rule 
The Divider will be given a card where he/she can write down his/her decision. A sample of the 
decision card is as below: 
   Divider: (Dividing rule) 
  I choose dividing rule_______. That is, for each dollar to divide: 
Divider gets_____¢     Designator gets____¢ 
 
Designator: (How many dollars to divide?  $0 or $20) 
  I choose to divide $______.  Therefore,  






After finishing the decision, the Divider will also write down the tag letter on the back of the decision 
cards and put it into his/her envelope. After every Divider has finished, the experimenter will take the 
envelopes to Room B.  
 
Step 3: Designator makes a decision. 
The experimenter will give each Divider’s envelope to his/her Designator according to the tag letter on 
the card. The designator will then decide how many dollars to divide ($0 or $20) and write that 
decision on the decision card. The designator will also be given a blank card where he/she can write a 
short message to the Divider and put both the decision card and the message card into the envelope. 
 
Step 4:  Return cards to the Dividers 
After all of the Designators have finished, the experimenter will take all of the envelopes to Room A 
and return the envelopes to their Dividers, according to their tag letters. When the Divider gets his/her 
envelope, he/she will see his/her Designator’s decision and the message the Designator wrote.  
 
Step 5: Receive cash payment privately 
  31Each Divider will be called one by one to the experimenter.  When called, the Divider will take his/her 
decision card, and the experimenter will calculate his/her final earnings and pay him/her privately. 
Then the Divider will exit the lab and drop all the other supplies into the box near the monitor room.  
The Designators will be paid after all of the Dividers have been paid and have left the lab. When called, 
the Designator will show the experimenter the tag letter and will be paid according to the 
corresponding decision card.  
 
Throughout this experiment, you won’t meet any Divider in Room A. 
 
End of Instructions 
Please raise your hand to indicate that you are finished reading these instructions. When you do, an 
experimenter will give you a few questions to ensure that you understand how you make decisions.  
 
 
 
  32